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ABSTRACT
The interaction between information technology and physical world makes Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) vulnerable to malicious attacks beyond the standard cyber attacks. This has motivated the need for attack-resilient
state estimation. Yet, the existing state-estimators are
based on the non-realistic assumption that the exact
system model is known. Consequently, in this work
we present a method for state estimation in presence
of attacks, for systems with noise and modeling errors.
When the the estimated states are used by a state-based
feedback controller, we show that the attacker cannot
destabilize the system by exploiting the difference between the model used for the state estimation and the
real physical dynamics of the system. Furthermore, we
describe how implementation issues such as jitter, latency and synchronization errors can be mapped into
parameters of the state estimation procedure that describe modeling errors, and provide a bound on the
state-estimation error caused by modeling errors. This
enables mapping control performance requirements into
real-time (i.e., timing related) specifications imposed on
∗
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the underlying platform. Finally, we illustrate and experimentally evaluate this approach on an unmanned
ground vehicle case-study.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: Security and Protection—Unauthorized
access; C.3 [Special-purpose and Application-based
Systems]: Process control systems

1.

INTRODUCTION

Tight coupling of computation and communication
substrates with sensing and actuation components in
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) has introduced significant changes in the system design process; the heterogeneity of these systems has challenged the standard design methods that completely ignore cross-cutting constraints, as component-level understanding usually does
not translate to the system level. A great example for
CPS are modern vehicles that present a complex interaction of a large number of embedded Electronic Control
Units, interacting with each other over different types
of networks. In addition, there is a current shift in
vehicle architectures, from isolated control systems to
more open automotive architectures that would introduce new services such as remote diagnostics and code
updates, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
Until recently, security of CPS (and embedded control
systems before) has usually been an afterthought. However, the increasing set of functionalities, network interoperability, and system design complexity may introduce security vulnerabilities that are easily exploitable.
The interaction between information technology and physical world have made CPS vulnerable to malicious attacks beyond the standard cyber attacks [5]. As shown
in [11, 6], using simple methods an attacker can disrupt
the operation of a car to either disable the vehicle or
hijack it. This problem is even more emphasized with

the rise of vehicle autonomy; thus, criticality analysis
for various automotive components will have to be completely re-done. Similarly, attacks on CPS could hamper
the critical infrastructure with undesired consequences
as illustrated in the Maroochy Water breach [18] and
StuxNet virus attack on a SCADA system used in industrial processes control [7].
Relying exclusively on cyber-security techniques for
securing CPS is insufficient. This is highlighted in cases
when non-invasive sensor attacks occur – i.e., when the
physical environment around a sensor is compromised to
allow for injection of a malicious signal [17]. For example, non-invasive attacks on Anti-lock Braking Systems
are presented in [17]. In addition, attacks on GPS sensors by spoofing a GPS to misguide a yacht off route
are demonstrated in [2], while [22] presents the steps
and equipment required for GPS spoofing.
These results have spanned research into control-level
techniques that address the problem of state estimation
and intrusion detection under attacks on the environment of the controller, such as attacks on sensors, actuators and communication networks (e.g., [19, 21, 15,
9, 20, 13]). Attack-resilient state estimation has drawn
considerable attention since knowing the system’s state
even when some components have been compromised
would allow for the use of the same controllers as in the
case without attacks. For deterministic linear systems
this problem has been recently mapped into l0 optimization problem [9, 15]. However, the proposed techniques
consider systems without noise and for which the exact
model of the system’s dynamics is known. As a result,
it is not clear whether most of the resilience guarantees
hold when these assumptions are violated.
This problem is even more emphasized when issues
inherently present in any system implementation are
taken into account. For example, real-time issues such
as sampling and actuation jitter, and synchronization
errors between system components directly affect the
controlled plant’s model that should be used for state
estimation. Consequently, there is a need to provide
a robust method for attack-resilient state estimation in
the presence of noise and modeling errors. This would
also allow for the extraction of system level requirements
imposed by control algorithms on the underlaying OS
and utilized networking, and facilitate reasoning about
attack-resilience across different implementation layers.
We address this problem in the paper. Building on the
work from [9] we present a procedure for attack-resilient
state estimation in presence of noise and modeling errors. We show that the attacker cannot destabilize the
system by exploiting the difference between the model
used for state estimation and the real physical dynamics
of the system. Furthermore, we describe how implementation issues such as jitter, latency and synchronization
errors can be mapped into parameters of the state esti-

mation procedure (describing modeling errors), and provide a bound on the state-estimation error due to the
modeling error. This effectively enables mapping control performance requirements into real-time (i.e., timing related) specifications imposed on the underlying
platform. Finally, we illustrate the use of this approach
on an autonomous robot case-study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an l0 -based state-estimator for deterministic linear systems, before describing common modeling errors caused by system implementation. Section 3
presents a resilient state estimator that can be used in
systems with modeling errors. In Section 4, we show
that the maximal state-estimation error is bounded, before we present a procedure that can be used to compute
a bound. We evaluate this procedure in Section 5 and
illustrate its use on unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)
case study (Section 6). Finally, we provide concluding
remarks in Section 7.

1.1

Notation and Terminology

For a set S, |S| denotes the cardinality (i.e., size) of
the set, while for two sets S and R, we use S \ R to
denote the set of elements in S that are not in R. In
addition, for a set K ⊂ S, we specify the complement
set of K with respect to S as K{ – i.e., K{ = S \ K. We
use R to denote the set of reals, and 10N to denote the
row vector of size N containing all ones.
We use AT to indicate the transpose of matrix A,
while the ith element of a vector xk is denoted by xk,i .
For vector x and matrix A, we use |x| and |A| to denote
the vector and matrix whose elements are absolute values of the initial vector and matrix, respectively. Also,
for matrices P and Q, P  Q specifies that the matrix
P is element-wise smaller than or equal to the matrix Q.
For a vector e ∈ Rp , the support of the vector is the set
supp(e) = {i | ei 6= 0} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., p},
while the l0 norm of vector e is the size of supp(e) –
i.e., kekl0 = |supp(e)|. For a matrix E ∈ Rp×N , we use
e1 , e2 , ..., eN to denote its columns and E01 , E02 , ..., E0p to
denote its rows. We define the row support of matrix E
as the set
rowsupp(E) = {i | E0i 6= 0} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., p}.
As for vectors, the l0 norm for a matrix E is defined as
kEkl0 = |rowsupp(E)|.

2.

MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION
Consider a Linear-Time Invariant (LTI) system
xk+1 = Axk + Buk + vk
yk = Cxk + wk + ek ,

(1)

where x ∈ Rn and u ∈ Rm denote the plant’s state and
input vectors, respectively, while y ∈ Rp is the plant’s
output vector obtained from measurements of p sensors
from the set S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sp }. Accordingly, the matrices A, B and C have suitable dimensions. Furthermore,
v ∈ Rn and w ∈ Rp denote the process and measurement noise vectors,1 while e ∈ Rp denotes the attack
vector. To model attacks on sensors, we assume that
sensors with indices in set K ⊆ {1, 2, ..., p} are under attack. This means that ek,i = 0 for all i ∈ KC and k ≥ 0,
where KC = S \ K, and thus supp(ek ) ⊆ K, ∀k ≥ 0.
Remark 1. The setup presented in this paper can be
easily extended to include attacks on system actuators.
In this case additional vector eak is added to the plant input at each step k ≥ 0. As shown in [8], the same technique used for resilient-state estimation in the presence
of attacks on sensors can be used to obtain the plant’s
state when both sensors and actuators are compromised.
Consequently, the analysis and results presented in this
paper can be easily extended to the case when a subset
of the actuators is also under attack.

2.1

Attack-resilient State Estimation
for Noiseless Systems

For linear systems without noise (i.e., systems from (1)
where wk = 0 and vk = 0, for all k ≥ 0), a l0 norm based method to extract state estimate in presence of attacks is introduced in [9]. To obtain the plant’s
state at any time-step t (i.e., xt ), the proposed procedure utilizes the previous N sensor measurement vectors
(yt−N +1 , ..., yt ) and actuator inputs (ut−N +1 , ..., ut−1 )
to evaluate the state xt−N +1 ; the state is computed as
the minimization argument of the following optimization problem2
min kYt,N − ΦN (x)kl0 .

x∈Rn

(2)

Here, Yt,N = [ỹt−N +1 |ỹt−N +2 | . . . |ỹt ] ∈ Rp×N aggregates the last N sensor measurements while taking into
account the inputs applied during that interval
k =t−N +1

ỹk = yk ,
ỹk = yk −

k−t+N
X −2

CAi Buk−1−i , k = t − N + 2, ..., N

i=0

In addition, ΦN : Rhn → Rp×N is a linear imapping
defined as ΦN (x) = Cx|CAx| . . . |CAN −1 x , which
1
Later we will assume that the noise vectors are constrained
in certain ways. Furthermore, we will use v and w to capture different types of modeling errors which may be caused
by some implementation (e.g., real-time) issues. We will address this in more details in Section 2.2.
2
The state xt can then be obtained from xt−N +1 and the
history of actuator inputs (ut−N +1 , ..., ut−1 ) by applying the
system evolution from (1) for N − 1 steps.

captures the system’s evolution over N steps caused by
the initial state x.
The rationale behind the problem (2) is that the matrix Et,N = Yt,N − ΦN (xt−N +1 ) presents the history of
the last N attacks vectors et−N +1 , ..., et – i.e.,
Et,N = [et−N +1 |et−N +2 | . . . |et ] ∈ Rp×N .

(3)

The critical observation here is that for a noiseless LTI
system there is a pattern of zeros (i.e., zero-rows) in
the matrix Et,N that corresponds to the non-attacked
sensors and which remains constant over time; if K is the
set of compromised sensors then rowsupp(Et,N ) ⊆ K,
for all N and t such that N ≥ 0 and t ≥ N − 1.
As shown in [8, 9], for noiseless systems the state estimator from (2) is optimal in the sense that if another estimator can recover xt−N +1 then the one defined in (2)
can as well. In addition, the estimator from (2) can
extract the system’s state after N steps when up to q
sensors are under attack if and only if for all x ∈ R\{0},
|supp(Cx) ∪ supp(CAx) ∪ . . . ∪ supp(CAN −1 x)| > 2q
We use qmax to denote the maximal number of compromised sensors for which the system’s state can be recovered after N steps despite attacks on sensors.3 Hence,
if the number of compromised sensors q satisfies that
q ≤ qmax , for noiseless systems the minimal l0 norm
of (2) is equal to q. Note that for these systems qmax
does not decrease with N, and due to Cayley-Hamilton
theorem [3] it cannot be further increased when more
than n previous measurements are used – i.e., qmax obtains the maximal value for N = n. Finally, beside the
measurement window size N , qmax only depends on the
system’s dynamics (i.e., matrices A and C).

2.2

Sources of Modeling Errors

Besides measurement and process noise, vectors vk
and wk in (1) can be used to capture any deviation in
the plant model (1) from the real dynamics of the controlled physical system. Here, we present some of the
common modeling errors introduced by non-idealities
of control system implementation and limitations of the
utilized computation and communication platforms. Specifically, we focus on the modeling errors caused by sampling and computation/actuation jitter, and synchronization errors between system components in scenarios
where continuous-time plants are being controlled.
The described attack-resilient state estimator (2) is
based on discrete-time model (1) of the system. Consequently, to be able to deal with continuous-time plants
it is necessary to discretize the controlled plant, while
taking into account real-time issues introduced by communication and computation schedules. To illustrate
3
The size of the utilized measurement history N is considered to be an input parameter to the resilient-state estimator. In the general case we should use the notation qmax,N .

this, consider a standard continuous-time plant model
ẋ(t) = Ac x(t) + Bc u(t)
y(t) = Cc x(t),

(4)

with state x(t) ∈ Rn , output y(t) ∈ Rp and input vector u(t) ∈ Rm , where matrices Ac , Bc , Cc are of the
appropriate dimensions.
We first consider setups where all plant’s output are
sampled (i.e., measured) at times tk , k ≥ 0, and where
all actuators apply newly calculated inputs at times
tk + τk , k ≥ 0, as shown in Fig. 1. We denote the
k th sampling period of the plant by Ts,k = tk+1 − tk ,
and note that the the input signal will have the form
shown in Fig. 1(b). Using the approach from [10, 23],
we describe the system as
ẋ(t) = Ac x(t) + Bc u(t),
y(t) = Cc x(t), t ∈ [tk + τk , tk+1 + τk+1 ),

(5)

u(t+ ) = uk , t ∈ {tk + τk , k = 0, 1, 2, . . .}
where u(t+ ) is a piecewise continuous function that only
changes values at time instances tk + τk , k ≥ 0. From
the above equation, the discretized model of the system
can be represented as [3]
xk+1 = Ak xk + Bk uk +
yk = Cxk ,

B−
k uk−1

(6)

where xk = x(tk ), k ≥ 0, and
Ak = eAc Ts,k ,
Z Ts,k −τk
Z
Bk =
eAc θ Bc dθ, B−
=
k

Ts,k

eAc θ Bc dθ.

Ts,k −τk

0

(7)
Note that the matrices Ak , Bk and B−
k are time-varying
(with k) and depend on the continuous-time plant dynamics, inter-sampling time Ts,k , and latency τk . On
the other hand, when control (and state estimation) is
performed using resource constrained CPUs, the designers usually utilize the ‘ideal’ discrete-time model of the
system of the form (1) where for all k ≥ 0, Ts,k = Ts
and τk = 0
Z Ts
A = eAc Ts , B =
eAc θ Bc dθ,
(8)
0

Hence, by comparing the discrete-time models (1) and (6),
in this case sampling and actuation jitter, and actuation latency (caused by computation and/or communication) introduce the error component vkjit (k ≥ 0)
defined as
Z Ts,k −τk
eAc θ Bc dθ uk
vkjit = (eAc Ts,k − eAc Ts ) xk +
{z
}
|
Ts
|
{z
}
∆A
∆B

+ B−
k uk−1

Figure 1: Scheduling sampling and actuation.
Finally, from the equation above it follows that a bound
on the size of the error vkjit can be obtained from the
conservative bounds on the sampling jitter (i.e., Ts,k −
Ts ) and latency (i.e., τk ), for a predefined range of acceptable system states and actuator inputs.

2.2.1

Effects of Synchronization Errors

Consider a setup where the sensors do not have a common clock source, resulting in a bounded error between
the individual clocks at sensors.4 In this case, although
scheduled to measure corresponding plant outputs at
the same time-instance tk , each sensor sj will actually
perform the measurement at time tk,j . Hence, for every
j = 1, ..., p, yk,j = C0j x(tk,j ) instead of C0j x(tk ), where
C0j denotes the j th row of C, and the synchronization
error introduces a measurement error defined as
syn
vk,j
= C0j (x(tk,j ) − x(tk ))

=

C0j (eAc ∆tk,j x(tk )

Z
+

∆tk,j

eAc θ Bc dθuk−1 )

0

Here, ∆tk,j = tk,j − tk captures the synchronization error for each sensor sj . Hence, for a predefined actuation
range it is possible to provide a bound on the size of the
measurement error vector vksyn ∈ Rp describing modeling errors due to synchronization errors between sensors.

2.3

Problem Description

The existence of modeling errors5 limits the use of the
attack-resilient state estimator from (2). For example,
in this case the l0 norm of a solution of the problem
4
To simplify the presentation we only describe the case
where there possibly exist synchronization errors between
sensors, because the same approach can be extended to
scenarios where there exist synchronization errors between
plant actuators.
5
In the rest of this paper, unless otherwise specified we will
include process and measurement noise as part of modeling errors. We will also use the term noise to capture the
modeling errors – i.e., discrepancy between the model used
to design the state-estimator and real dynamics of the controlled system.

in (2) may be larger than qmax , indicating that more
than the allowed number of sensors has been compromised, which violates requirements for correct operation
of the state estimator. Therefore, in this paper we focus
on the following problems
• How can we design attack-resilient state estimators
in presence of noise and modeling errors?
• Can the attacker exploit the modeling errors in
the state-estimator’s design in order to destabilize
the system when the state estimates are used for
control by a stable state-based feedback controller?
• Is it possible to obtain a bound on the worst-case
performance degradation of the introduced resilientstate estimator due to bounded modeling errors?

3.

RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATION IN
PRESENCE OF MODELING ERRORS

As illustrated in Section 2, the effects of the input
vectors uk are taken into account when computing the
matrix Yt,N . Thus, in the rest of this paper (unless
otherwise stated) we will assume that in (1) uk = 0 for
all k ≥ 0. In addition, to further simplify the notation
we consider the case for t = N −1, meaning that our goal
is to obtain x0 , and we denote the matrices Yt,N , Et,N
and ΦN (x) as Y, E and Φ(x), respectively.
We assume that the state of the plant at k = 0 is
x0 and that the system evolves for N steps as specified
in (1) (for uk = 0) for some attack vectors e0 , ..., eN −1
applied on the sensors from set K = {si1 , ..., siq } ⊆ S,
where |K| ≤ qmax , and the corresponding matrix E =
[e0 |e1 | . . . |eN −1 ]. Furthermore, we assume that |wk | 
wk and |vk |  vk for k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, and we define
Yw,v = [y0 |y1 | . . . |yN −1 ] .
Note that the matrix Yw,v contains measurements of
the system with noise. Finally, we use Ȳ = [ȳ0 |ȳ1 |...|ȳN −1 ]
to denote the sensor measurements (plant outputs) that
would be obtained in this case if the system was noiseless – i.e., for kwk k2 = kvk k2 = 0 (meaning that
ȳk = CAk x0 + ek , k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1).
We consider the following optimization problem
P0 (Y) :

min kEkl0
E,x

(9)

s. t. E = Y − Φ(x)
As described in Section 2.1,
(x0 , E) = arg max P0 (Ȳ)

(10)

where q = kEkl0 ≤ qmax . However, the ‘ideal’ (noiseless) measurements from Ȳ are not available to the estimator; the estimator can only use the measurements
specified by the matrix Yw,v . In addition, it is worth
noting that (x0 , E) may not even be a feasible point for

problem P0 (Yw,v ) that utilizes noisy sensor measurements. Consequently, there is need to adapt problem
P0 (Y) to non-ideal models that capture noise and modeling errors.
To achieve this we consider the following problem that
relaxes the equality constraint from (9) by including a
noise allowance
P0,∆ (Y) :
min kEkl0
E,x
(11)
s. t. |Y − Φ(x) − E|  ∆
In the above problem, the matrix ∆ ∈ Rp×N contains
non-negative tolerances δj,i for each sensor si , i = 1, ..., p,
in each of the N steps j – i.e.,
∆ = [δ0 |δ1 | . . . |δN −1 ] .
We use the following notation
(x0,∆ , E∆ ) = arg max P0,∆ (Yw,v )
q∆ = kE∆ kl0

(12)

Note that P0,0p×N (Y) = P0 (Y), for all Y ∈ Rp×N .
To allow for the use of (11) as an attack-resilient state
estimator it is necessary to ensure that P0,∆ (Y) has a
feasible point (x, E) such that kEkl0 ≤ qmax .6 This can
be guaranteed with an appropriate initialization of the
matrix ∆. From (1) we have that for k = 0, 1, ..., N − 17
yk = CAk x0 + ek + C

k−1
X

Ak−1−i vi + wk

i=0

= ȳk + C

k−1
X

Ak−1−i vi + wk

i=0

If we use |Ak−1−i | to denote the matrix whose elements are absolute values of the corresponding elements
of the matrix Ak−1−i , then we can specify the following
bound
|yk − ȳk | ≤ |C|

k−1
X

|Ak−1−i ||vi | + |wk |

i=0

≤ |C|

k−1
X

|Ak−1−i |vi + wi = δ̄k .

(13)

i=0

Therefore, for δk  δ̄k (k = 0, ..., N − 1) we have that
(x0 , E) from (10) is a feasible point for the problem
P0,∆ (Yw,v ), meaning that there exists a solution of the
problem – i.e., there exists (x0,∆ , E∆ ) from (12) such
that q∆ = q ≤ qmax . This means that the solution of
P0,∆ (Yw,v ) from (11) can be used as a state-estimator
in the sense that if at most qmax sensors have been compromised it would provide a solution where the size of
row-support of E∆ is not larger than qmax .
6
This condition has to be satisfied for all Y ∈ Rp×N that
could be ‘generated’ by the system when at most qmax sensors have been attacked.
P
7
We assume that −1
i=0 αi = 0 for any sequence of αi s.

4.

ROBUSTNESS OF P0,∆ (Y) STATE ESTIMATION

In this section, we provide robustness analysis for
P0,∆ (Y) optimization problem when matrix ∆ satisfies
conditions from the previous section. We start by showing that the attacker cannot exploit the modeling errors
to destabilize the system before we present a method to
bound the error caused by noise and modeling errors –
i.e., we provide a bound on kx0,∆ − x0 k2 .
Consider (x0,∆ , E∆ ) from (12), and a matrix Σ ∈
Rp×N such that

We use the following notation – for any set K ⊆ S we
define the matrix OK as


PK C
 PK CA 


(20)
OK = 
.
..


.
PK CAN −1

implying that kE − E∆ kl0 ≤ 2q. Our goal is to provide
a bound on k∆xk2 where

Here, PK denotes the projection from the set S to the
set K by keeping only rows of C with indices that correspond to sensors from K.8 Since KF ⊂ S contains
indices of zero-rows of Φ(∆x) we have that OKF ∆x = 0.
In addition, OKF1 ∆x = ΩKF1 , where for Ω = [ω1 |ω2 |...|ωN ]
(i.e., ωi , i = 1, ...N are columns of Ω such that |ωi | 
2δi ), and we define




PKF1 ω1
PKF1 δ1
 PKF ω2 
 PKF δ2 
1
1




ΩKF1 = 
 ∆KF1 = 
.
..
..




.
.
PKF1 ωN
PKF1 δN

∆x = x0,∆ − x0 .

Consequently, for ∆x to satisfy constraints (19) and (18)
there have to exist sets KF , KF1 ⊂ S such that

Y − Φ(x0,∆ ) − E∆ = Σ.

(14)

Here, |Σ|  ∆. In addition, because (x0 , E) is a feasible
point for P0,∆ (Y), it follows that
q = kEkl0 ≥ kE∆ kl0 = q∆ ,

(15)

If we also define ∆E = E∆ − E, it holds that

|KF | = F, |KF1 | =p − 2qmax − F,
KF ∩ KF1 = ∅
OKF ∆x = 0
|OKF1 ∆x|  2∆KF1

∆E = (Yw,v − Φ(x0,∆ ) − Σ) − (Ȳ − Φ(x0 ))
= (Yw,v − Ȳ − Σ) −Φ(∆x0 )
{z
}
|
Ω

Let us denote by ∆y0 , ..., ∆yN −1 the columns of the
matrix Ω (i.e., Ω = [∆y0 |...|∆yN −1 ]). From (13) and (14)
it follows that
|∆yk |  δ̄k + δk  2δk
Accordingly, to provide a bound on k∆xk2 we consider the following problem
max
∆x

k∆xk2

kΦ(∆x) − Ωkl0 ≤ 2q
Ω  2∆

Since q ≤ qmax , we can increase the feasible space by
relaxing constraint (17) to
kΩ − Φ(∆x)kl0 ≤ 2qmax

We consider the polyhedron P defined with constraints
(21)-(24). Note that the point ∆x = 0 belongs to the
polyhedron. In the rest of this section we will first
prove that the polyhedron is bounded, before we present
a procedure that can be used to provide a bound on
max k∆xk2 . We start by introducing the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any two sets KF , KF1 ⊂ S such that
|KF | = F , |KF1 | = p − 2qmax − F and KF ∩ KF1 = ∅,

(16)
(17)
(18)

(19)

Therefore, our goal is to bound ∆x for which there exists
Ω ∈ Rp×N that satisfies (18), and for where at least
p − 2qmax rows of the matrix Φ(∆x) − Ω are zero-rows.
Let us use F and KF ⊂ S to denote the number of rows
Φ∆(x) that are zero-rows and the set of corresponding
sensors, respectively. This means that at least Fc =
p − 2qmax − F rows of Φ(∆x) are equal to the rows of
Ω, which are non-zero, and we use KF1 ⊂ S to denote
sensors corresponding to those rows. It is worth noting
here that |KF ∪ KF1 | = p − 2qmax and KF ∩ KF1 = ∅.

(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)

rank(OKF ∪KF1 ) = n.

(25)

Proof. From [9], qmax = ds/2 − 1e where s is the
cardinality of the smallest set K ⊆ S for which the
matrix OK{ has non-trivial kernel. Note that |K{ | =
p − s, and since s ≥ 2qmax + 1 > 2qmax , it follows that
|K{ | < p − 2qmax . Now consider any set K1 for which
|K1{ | ≥ p − 2qmax , meaning that |K1 | ≤ 2qmax < s.
Thus, OK{ does not have non-trivial kernel (since K is
1
the smallest such matrix), meaning that columns of OK{
1

{

are linearly independent. Thus, since OK{ ∈ RN |K1 |×n ,
1

rank(OK{ ) = n.
1


8

i0k

1





Formally, PK =  ... , where K = {sk1 , ..., sk|K| } and
0
ik

|K|

k1 < k2 < ... < k|K| , and i0j denotes the row vector (of
appropriate size) with a 1 in its j th position.

The above relation holds for any K1{ with at least p −
2qmax sensors, and hence (25) holds since the set KF ∪
KF1 contains p − 2qmax sensors.
Theorem 1. The polyhedron P defined by constraints
(21)-(24) is bounded.
Proof. We start by assuming the opposite, that P
is unbounded; there exist a feasible point ∆x ∈ P and
a direction d ∈ Rn such that d 6= 0 and for any  > 0,
∆x + d ∈ P [4]. Therefore, OKF (∆x + d) = 0, and
since ∆x ∈ P it follows that OKF d = 0. In addition,
|OKF1 (∆x + d)|  2∆KF1

(26)

implies that OKF1 d = 0 (otherwise, for any non-zero
element of the vector OKF1 d, when  → ∞ the absolute value of that element in vector OKF1 d will be
unbounded and the constraint (26) will be violated).
Therefore, d belongs to the kernel of OKF ∪KF1 – i.e.,
OKF ∪KF1 d = 0. However, from Lemma 1, OKF ∪KF1
has full rank (i.e., rank(OKF ∪KF1 ) = n), meaning that
it does not have a non-trivial kernel and thus d = 0,
which violates our initial assumption and concludes the
proof.
As a direct consequence of the above theorem we have
that maximal k∆xk2 is bounded, and the attacker
can not use modeling errors and the corresponding relaxation of the l0 optimization problem to
introduce unbounded error in the attack-resilient
state estimator. Thus, we can formulate the corollary.
Corollary 1. Consider a matrix K such that A + BK
is stable. If x0,∆ from (12) is used as state estimate by
the state-feedback controller K (i.e., u = Kx0,∆ ) then
the closed-loop system will remain stable when at most
qmax sensors have been compromised.

4.1

Bounding the State-estimation Error

Theorem 1 also facilitates bounding the error of the
resilient state estimator P0,∆ (Yw,v ) by starting from
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider the optimization problem

+−
where ∆+−
KF1 denotes a vector such that |∆KF1 | = ∆KF1
(i.e., with elements whose absolute values are equal to
the corresponding elements of ∆KF1 ). It is worth noting
that there are 2|KF1 |·N such elements and thus 2|KF1 |·N
vertices of the polyhedron. Finally, since ÕKF ∪KF1 is a
full rank matrix (rank(ÕKF ∪KF1 ) = rank(OKF ∪KF1 ) =
n), vertex points can be found as


0
∆xver = (ÕTKF ∪KF1 ÕKF ∪KF1 )−1 ÕTKF ∪KF1 2∆+− .
KF1

(28)
Consequently, for any sets KF and KF1 that satisfy
(21) and (22), by checking all 2|KF1 |·N vertices defined
by (28) we can determine the maximal k∆xk2 for the
corresponding polyhedron. However, since
+−
k∆xver (∆+−
KF )k2 = k∆xver (−∆KF )k2 ,
1

1

where ∆xver (∆+−
KF1 ) denotes the solution of (28) for spe+−
cific ∆KF , we only need to evaluate norms at 2|KF1 |·N −1
1
points (i.e., vertices). Furthermore, to provide a bound
on k∆xk2 for all ∆x that satisfy (18) and (19) we have
to consider all such sets KF and KF1 . Therefore, it is
necessary to evaluate all possible values for F . From the
definition F ≥ 0. On the other hand, from (23) OKF
has a nontrivial kernel, meaning that as in the proof of
Lemma 1, F = |KF | ≤ p − s ≤ p − 2qmax − 1.
This allows for the formulation of Algorithm 1 and
proves the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 provides an upper bound
on the state estimation error kx0,∆ − x0 k2 .
Finally, note that the matrix ∆ captures several sources
of modeling errors (e.g., noise, jitter, synchronization
errors). Since (28) is linear in ∆, the estimation error
bound obtained by Algorithm 1 for ∆ will be less than
or equal to the sum of estimation error bounds computed separately for each error component. Thus, it is
possible to analyze the impact of each source of modeling errors on robustness of the state estimator.

max f (x)
x∈Q

n

where f : R → R is a convex function and Q is a
bounded polyhedron. Then, there exists an optimal solution f (x∗ ) where x∗ is a vertex of the polyhedron Q.
Proof. See Appendix 8.
From the above lemma, to determine the maximal
k∆xk2 over the polyhedron P it is sufficient to compute
k∆xk2 at each vertex of the polyhedron. On the other
hand, the vertices of the polyhedron satisfy that




0
OKF
·∆x = 2∆+− ,
(27)
OKF
KF1
| {z 1 }
ÕKF ∪KF

1

4.1.1

Complexity of Algorithm 1

The complexity of Algorithm 1 depends on the number of plant states and sensors (n and p, respectively),
considered window size (i.e., history) N , and the maximal number of attacked sensors qmax for which it is
possible to estimate the state of the noiseless system after N steps. Hence, in the general case the number of
times that equation (28) needs to be solved is

p−s  
X
p
p−F
2(p−2qmax −F )N −1
F
p − 2qmax − F
F =0

However, for almost all systems, meaning that for almost all pairs of matrices A × C ∈ Rn×n × Rp×n (i.e.,

Algorithm 1 Design-time procedure used to provide
a bound on ∆x
1: M AX k∆xk = 0
2: for F = 0, 1, ..., p − s do
3:
4:
5:

for all sets KF ⊂ S with F elements do
for all sets KF1 ⊂ (S \ KF ) with p − 2qmax − F
elements do
for all ∆+−
KF do
1

Compute ∆xver using (28)
if k∆xver k2 > M AX k∆xk then
M AX k∆xk = k∆xver k2
end if

6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

end for
end for
end for

13: end for

chosen independently for each attacked sensor, and (c)
Noise realizations between the noise bounds specified by
matrices ∆.
In both simulations and Algorithm 1 executions, we
considered the case when window size N is equal to the
number of system states (i.e., N = n). Comparison
between the bounds provided by Algorithm 1 and simulation results are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Fig. 2(a),
Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 3(a) present histograms of k∆xk2 errors for all 1000 scenarios for three randomly selected
systems. As can be seen, the bound provided by Algorithm 1 is an order of magnitude larger than the average state-estimation error for each system. However, for
each system S we are more interested in the ratio between the worst-case observed state estimation error for
all 1000 simulations – i.e., maxi=1:1000 k∆xS k2 , and the
error bound M AX k∆xS k2 provided by Algorithm 1
for the system. Thus, we consider relative estimation
error defined for each system S as
Rel errorS =

the set of matrices for which the property does not
hold has Lebesgue measure zero), the number of correctable errors using the previous N = n measurement
vectors is (maximal and) equal to qmax = dp/2 − 1e [9].
Note that in this case s = p, and thus F can only
take thevalue 0 in Algorithm 1. On the other hand,
p−1
p is odd
2
and thus
qmax =
p
2 − 1 p is even

1, p is odd
|KF1 | =
2, p is even
Therefore, for almost all systems with n states and p
sensors, if we use N = n past measurement vectors the
complexity of Algorithm 1 is p · 2n−1 if p is an odd number, or p(p−1)
22n−1 if the system has an even number
2
of sensors.

5.

EVALUATION

To evaluate conservativeness of the error bound obtained using Algorithm 1 we consider two types of systems – systems with n = 10 states and p = 5 sensors, and with n = 20 states and p = 11 sensors. For
each system type we randomly generated 100 systems
with measurement models satisfying that the rows of
the C matrix have unit magnitude and matrices ∆ had
elements between 0 and 2. In addition, for each of
the 200 systems we evaluated the state-estimation error ∆x = kx0,∆ − x0 k2 in 1000 experiments for various
attack and noise realizations. Attacks and noise profiles
were chosen randomly assuming uniform distribution
of the following: (a) The number of attacked sensors between 0 and 2 for systems with 5 sensors, and between
0 and 5 for systems with 11 sensors, (b) Attack vectors on the compromised sensors between −10 and 10,

maxi=1:1000 ∆xS
.
M AX k∆xS k2

A histogram of the relative errors for both types of systems are presented in Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 3(b). For the
systems with n = 10 states the maximal relative error reaches almost 20% of computed bounds, while for
larger system (with n = 20 states) the maximal relative
error is 2% of computed bounds.
However, it is worth noting here that conservativeness
of the presented results is (at least partially) caused by
the fact that for each system we only considered random
initial points, and random uncorrelated attack vectors
and noise profiles/modeling errors. Thus, the errors obtained through simulation do not represent the worstcase errors; for each system, to obtain scenarios that
result in the worst-case estimation errors it is necessary
to derive the corresponding attack vector (and the initial state), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
This is especially illustrated in histograms of relative
estimation errors for systems with different size. As in
the histograms from Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 3(b), in simulations we observed a decrease in the obtained maximal
relative estimation error with an increase in the system
size n (and thus increase in the window size N = n).
One of the reasons is that with the increase of N we
increase the number of attack vectors, and due to the
random selection of the attack vectors we reduce probabilities to incorporate a worst-case attack. On the other
hand, for systems with n = 1 and n = 2 states we
were able to generate initial states and attack vectors for
which the bounds from Algorithm 1 are tight – i.e., the
error k∆xk2 is equal to the obtained bounds.

6.

CASE STUDY
We illustrate the development framework on a design

(a) Histogram for a system with error (b) Histogram for a system with error (c) Histogram of the maximal relative
bound 41.43
bound 35.74
state-estimation error for all 100 system

Figure 2: Simulation results for 1000 runs of 100 randomly selected systems with n = 10 states and
p = 5 sensors.

(a) Histogram for a system with error
bound 155.98

(b) Histogram of the maximal relative
state-estimation error for all 100 system

Figure 3: Simulation results for 1000 runs of 100 randomly selected systems with n = 20 states and
p = 11 sensors.
of secure cruise control of the LandShark vehicle [1], a
fully electric Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) shown
in Fig. 4(a). In a tethered mode, the robot can be fully
tele-operated from the Operator Control Unit (OCU).
However, in our scenario the operator only specifies the
desired vehicle speed, while the on-board control has to
ensure that all of the safety requirements are satisfied
even if some of the sensors are under attack.

Vehicle Modeling
To obtain a dynamical model of the vehicle we used the
standard differential drive vehicle model (Fig. 4(b)) [12].
Here, Fl and Fr denote forces on the left and right set
of wheels respectfully, and Br is the mechanical resistance of the wheels to rolling. The vehicle position
is specified by its x and y coordinates, θ denotes the
heading angle of the vehicle measured from the x axis,
while v is the speed of the vehicle in this direction. The
LandShark employs skid steering, meaning that in order to make a turn it is necessary to generate enough
torque to overcome the sticking force Sl . Therefore,
when B2 |Fl − Fr | ≥ Sl the wheels start to slide sideways

(i.e., the vehicle begins to turn). Consequently, if we assume that the wheels do not slip, the dynamical model
of the vehicle can be specified as
 1
m (Fl + Fr − (Bs + Br )v, if turning
v̇ =
1
if not turning
m (Fl + Fr − Br v,
 1 B
if turning
Jt ( 2 (Fl − Fr ) − Bl ω,
ω̇ =
0,
if not turning
θ̇ = ω
ẋ = v sin(θ),

ẏ = v cos(θ)

Also, w = 0 if the vehicle is not turning.
Finally, to estimate the state of the vehicle for cruise
control (i.e., its speed and position) we use three sensors
– two speed encoders, one on each set of wheels, and a
GPS. The GPS provides time-stamped global position
and speed, while from the encoders we can obtain the
rotation angle (which could be translated into rotational
velocity and finally into linear velocity). Note that other
sensors can be used to estimate the state of the vehicle;
for instance, linear acceleration measurements coming
from the IMU, or use optical flow algorithms to com-

Figure 4: LandShark unmanned ground vehicle; (a) The vehicle; (b) Coordinate system and variables
used to derive the model; (c) Control system diagram used for cruise control.
pute visual odometry from a camera. However, to illustrate the use (and robustness) of the attack-resilient
state estimator we only used the encoders and GPS.
The above model presents a high-level model of the
vehicle, describing only the motion equations. However,
the forces Fl and Fr , which can be considered as inputs
to the model, are derived from the vehicle’s electromotors and are affected by the motors, gearbox and wheels.
Thus, we have also derived a 6-state linear model of this
low-level electromechanical system based on the model
from [12], which is then used to derive a local state (i.e.,
velocity) feedback controller that provides the desired
Fl , Fr levels.

middleware [16]. ROS is a meta-operating system that
facilitates development of robotic applications using a
publish/subscribe mechanism in which a master superintend every operation. There is a driver associated with
each sensor, which takes care of getting time stamped
informations from the sensor and publishing this data
in the ROS format to the ROS master. The controller
written in C++ language subscribes to each sensor measurements (called topics) through the master, and sends
inputs to the motor driver in order to maintain the desired cruise control speed.

Experiments

Fig. 5 presents a deployment of the robot during experiments run on a tiled uneven surface and a grass
uneven field. From the developed GUI we demonstrate
On the LandShark, the CPU that implements the statethat the robot can reach and maintain the desired referestimation and controller procedure is connected to all
ence speed even when one of the sensors is under attack,
sensors through independent serial buses, while the moas shown in Fig. 6. Fig. 6(a) presents speed estimates
tors are connected to the CPU via motor drivers (as
from the encoders and GPS; each of the sensors has
presented in Fig. 4(c)). Since the speed of the vehicle is
been attacked at some point, with attacks such that
bounded, the attack-resilient state-estimator from (11)
their measurements would result in the speed estimate
can be formulated as a mixed linear integer programequal to 4 m/s, except in the last period of the simulaming (MILP) problem
tion when we have switched to an alternating attack on
min
1>
pγ
the encoder left. However, as shown in Fig. 6(b) when
γ,E,x
the attack-resilient controller is active the robot reaches
−δk  yk − CAk x − ek  δk , k = 0, ..., N − 1
and maintains the desired speed of 1 m/s. On the other
−γj α · 10N E0j  γj α · 10N , j = 1, ..., p
hand, if the state estimator is disabled and instead a
simple observer is employed (as in the interval between
0
th
th
where Ej and ek denote the j row and k column of
68 s and 73 s – the shredded area in Fig. 6), even when
the matrix E ∈ Rp×N , respectively. Here, γ = (γ1 , . . . , γp ) ∈
one of the sensors is under attack the robot cannot reach
{0, 1}p are binary optimization variables representing,
the desired state (e.g., it can even be forced to stop).10
for each sensor j, whether the sensor is considered attacked (γj = 1) or safe (γj = 0), and α is a sufficiently
Robustness Analysis
large positive constant.9
All ROS nodes are executed in the run-to-completion
The developed resilient controller is executed on top
manner. Thus, although the execution period for the
of Linux OS and the Robot Operating System (ROS)
controller node is 20 ms, other instantiated nodes might
9
Since the robot cannot obtain speed larger than 20 mph, all
affect its execution (i.e., the controller might run with a

System Architecture

sensor measurements larger than the value are obtained from
compromised sensors and thus can be discarded. Hence, we
can assume that elements of attack vectors can not be larger
than the maximal speed.

10

Videos of the Landshark experiments can be seen at
http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~pajic/research/CPS_
security.html.

Figure 6: Experimental results; (a) Comparison of velocity estimated from the encoders’ and GPS
measurements; (b) Reference speed, the estimated speed, and the input applied to the motors.

Figure 5: Deployment of the LandShark on a
tiled pathway. The picture in the picture displays the user interface used in experiments.
variable period). Each sensor has its own clock and all
measurements are time-stamped before being transmitted to the controller. However, since relative changes in
obtained measurements are used, time synchronization
error between sensors does not accumulate. In addition, there is a huge discrepancy between sensors’ sampling jitters. For example, encoders’ sampling jitters
are bounded by 100 µs (as shown in Fig. 7), while GPS
has highly variable jitter with maximal values up to
125 ms. Therefore, it is not possible to use the idealized discrete-time model from (8), but rather the full
input compensation has to be done as in (6) and (7),
before the state-estimator is executed.
Consequently, a bound on GPS error is determined
from manufacturer specifications, worst-case sampling
jitter and synchronization error, and is experimentally
validated to be δk,1 ≤ 0.4 m/s. On the other hand,
each encoder has 192 cycles per revolution, resulting
in a measuring error of 0.5%. Thus, since the maximal
achievable vehicle speed is 20 m/s, we have that for both
encoders δk,2 = δk,2 ≤ 0.1 m/s. For these values Alg. 1
provides a state-estimation error bound of 0.72 m/s.

Figure 7: Times between consecutive left encoder measurements.
Note that the conservativeness of the bound was mostly
caused by the large worst-case GPS sampling jitter.

7.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have considered the problem of attackresilient state estimation in systems with noise and where
the exact model of the system dynamics is not known.
We have described a l0 -norm based state estimator that
can be used for these systems, and showed that the attacker cannot exploit the noise and limitations in model
accuracy to destabilize the system. Furthermore, we
have provided an algorithm to derive a bound for the
state estimation error caused by noise and modeling errors, and presented a procedure to map these bounds
into a set of implementation specifications imposed on
the underlying platform. Finally, we have illustrated
our approach by designing an attack-resilient constant
speed cruise controller for unmanned ground vehicle.
We have shown that the presented l0 -norm optimization procedure for state estimation can be formulated
as a mixed integer linear program. Although there exist
efficient MILP solvers, MILPs are effectively NP hard.

Therefore, the natural next step would include transforming the l0 state estimator into a convex program
based on l1 /lr optimization (e.g., r = 2) as done in [8].
In this case, providing a bound for the state-estimation
error when the l1 /lr convex relaxation is used will be an
avenue for future work.

8.

APPENDIX

Proof of Theorem 2. The proof uses a generalization of the proof of Theorem 2 from [14]. We start
by assuming that there exist a non-vertex point x̃0 =
arg maxx∈Q f (x), and that for every vertex point x ∈ Q,
f (x) < f (x̃). Note that x̃0 exists since the polyhedron
Q is bounded. Since x̃0 is not a vertex of Q ∈ Rn , less
than n constraints used to specify Q are active at x̃0 [4];
we denote by d (d < n) the number of active constraints
in x̃0 and denote them as aTi x̃0 = bi , i = {j1 , ..., jd }.
Thus, the vectors ai , i = j1 , ..., jd belong to a proper
subspace of Rn and there exists d ∈ Rn such that d 6= 0
and aTi d = 0, for all i = j1 , ..., jd .
Consider vectors x̃0 + d and x̃0 − d for any  >
0. From the definition of x̃0 , f (x̃0 ) ≥ f (x̃0 + d) and
f (x̃0 ) ≥ f (x̃0 − d), meaning that
1
(f (x̃0 + d) + f (x̃0 − d)).
2
However, since f is a convex function, we have that for
all  > 0
f (x̃0 ) ≥

f (x̃0 ) = f (x̃0 + d) = f (x̃0 − d).

(29)

Because Q is bounded, there exists some 1 > 0 for
which additional constraint used to specify Q gets activated either at point x̃0 +1 d or x̃0 −1 d. Let us denote
that point as x̃1 . Note that from (29), f (x̃0 ) = f (x̃1 )
and that at x̃1 at least d + 1 constraints used to specify
Q are activate (because all previously active constrains
will remain active).
The above procedure can be repeated until we reach
a point x̃r (r ≤ n − d, i.e., in at most n − d steps) in
which n constraints are activated and where f (x̃r ) =
f (x̃0 ). However, since in x̃r exactly n constraints used
to specify Q are active we have that x̃r is a vertex of
the polyhedron [4], and therefore there exist an optimal
point of the maximization problem that is a vertex of
the polyhedron Q.

9.

REFERENCES

[1] Black-I Robotics LandShark UGV.
http://www.blackirobotics.com/LandShark UGV UC0M.html.
[2] “Spoofers” Use Fake GPS Signals to Knock a Yacht Off
Course. MIT Technology Review, August 14, 2013.
[3] P. Antsaklis and A. Michel. Linear Systems. McGraw Hill,
1997.
[4] D. Bertsimas and J. Tsitsiklis. Introduction to Linear
Optimization. Athena Scientific, 1st edition, 1997.
[5] A. Cardenas, S. Amin, and S. S. Sastry. Research challenges
for the security of control systems. In Proc. 3rd USENIX
Workshop on Hot topics in security, 2008. Article 6.

[6] S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson,
H. Shacham, S. Savage, K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner,
and T. Kohno. Comprehensive experimental analyses of
automotive attack surfaces. In Proceedings of USENIX
Security Symposium, 2011.
[7] J. P. Farwell and R. Rohozinski. Stuxnet and the future of
cyber war. Survival, 53(1):23–40, 2011.
[8] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi. Secure
state-estimation for dynamical systems under active
adversaries. In Proceedings of the 2011 49th Annual
Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and
Computing (Allerton), pages 337–344, 2011.
[9] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi. Secure estimation
and control for cyber-physical systems under adversarial
attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1205.5073, 2012.
[10] J. P. Hespanha, P. Naghshtabrizi, and Y. Xu. A survey of
recent results in networked control systems. Proceedings of
the IEEE, Special Issue on Technology of Networked
Control Systems, 95(1):138 – 162, 2007.
[11] K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, S. Patel, T. Kohno,
S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson,
H. Shacham, and S. Savage. Experimental security analysis
of a modern automobile. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), pages 447 –462, 2010.
[12] J. J. Nutaro. Building Software for Simulation: Theory and
Algorithms, with Applications in C++. Wiley, 2010.
[13] M. Pajic, N. Bezzo, J. Weimer, R. Alur, R. Mangharam,
N. Michael, G. J. Pappas, O. Sokolsky, P. Tabuada,
S. Weirich, et al. Towards synthesis of platform-aware
attack-resilient control systems. In Proc. 2nd ACM
international conference on High Confidence Networked
Systems, pages 75–76, 2013.
[14] M. Pajic, R. Mangharam, O. Sokolsky, D. Arney,
J. Goldman, and I. Lee. Model-driven safety analysis of
closed-loop medical systems. IEEE Transactions on
Industrial Informatics, 10(1):3–16, 2014.
[15] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dörfler, and F. Bullo. Attack detection
and identification in cyber-physical systems. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, 58(11):2715–2729,
2013.
[16] M. Quigley, B. Gerkey, K. Conley, J. Faust, T. Foote,
J. Leibs, E. Berger, R. Wheeler, and A. Y. Ng. ROS: an
open-source robot operating system. In Proceedings of the
Open-Source Software workshop at the International
Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA),
volume 3, 2009.
[17] Y. Shoukry, P. Martin, P. Tabuada, and M. Srivastava.
Non-invasive spoofing attacks for anti-lock braking systems.
In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES
2013, pages 55–72. Springer, 2013.
[18] J. Slay and M. Miller. Lessons learned from the maroochy
water breach. In Critical Infrastructure Protection, pages
73–82, 2007.
[19] R. Smith. A decoupled feedback structure for covertly
appropriating networked control systems. Proc. IFAC
World Congress, pages 90–95, 2011.
[20] S. Sundaram, M. Pajic, C. Hadjicostis, R. Mangharam, and
G. Pappas. The Wireless Control Network: Monitoring for
malicious behavior. In Proc. 49th IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, pages 5979–5984, 2010.
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